Incentive reward mechanism for Participants to the human computing system of Intrusion Detection Based on Game Theory
Subject Areas : Generalyahya lormohammad hasani esfandghe 1 * , majid ghayori 2
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Keywords: Intrusion Detection, Human computation, Game Theory, Incentive reward, Kappa coefficient. ,
Abstract :
Despite the tremendous advances in the design of human computing systems, most of them suffer from low participation or poor quality participation and a high percentage of them fail. To a large extent, the success of these systems depends on people who really behave in the system. Because human computing systems include small units of work, and each job yields little benefit to the participants, humans display a good behavior in the system if they are well-stimulated for doing so. In this paper, this issue investigated in the Intrusion Detection Human Computation system. Our purpose of creating the stimulus for increasing of employee participation is to do their jobs carefully and effortlessly with the lowest possible cost. After selecting the appropriate stimuli for this system, we designed the mechanism of rewarding incentives. The idea behind this mechanism is to use the skill of the staff in determining their rewards. After designing this mechanism, we used the theory of games to analyze and determine the game's balance. Then, we determine the minimum possible reward for each category of work using the results obtained from the mechanism analysis based on game theory. We validate of this mechanism using game theory and the results of implementation. Designing this mechanism will increase the accuracy of respondents in answering and as a result, increase the accuracy of the human intelligence detection system in identifying new attacks and reducing their erroneous alert rates. Also, by allocating the lowest financial resources required to employees based on the analysis obtained from the game theory and managing human computing system of Intrusion Detection, encourages participants to participate in the system and, as a result, prevent the failure of the human computing system of intrusion detection.
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